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Abstract
This paper evaluates, in the context of economic geography estimates, the magnitude of
the distortions arising from the choice of zoning system, which is also known as the Modifi-
able Areal Unit Problem (MAUP). We consider three standard economic geography exercises
(the analysis of spatial concentration, agglomeration economies, and trade determinants), us-
ing various French zoning systems differentiated according to the size and shape of spatial
units, which are the two main determinants of the MAUP. While size matters a little, shape
does so much less. Both dimensions seem to be of secondary importance compared to spe-
cification issues.
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1 Introduction
Most empirical work in economic geography relies on scattered geo-coded data that are ag-
gregated into discrete spatial units, such as cities or regions. However, the aggregation of spatial
dots into boxes of different size and shape is not benign regarding statistical inference. Up until
recently, economists paid little attention to the sensitivity of statistical results to the choice of
a particular zoning system, known as the Modifiable Areal Unit Problem (henceforth MAUP).
Our main objective here is to assess whether differences in results across empirical studies are
really sparked by economic phenomena in the process under scrutiny, or rather just by different
zoning systems. We first investigate whether changes in either the size (equivalently the num-
ber) of spatial units, or their shape (equivalently the drawing of their boundaries) alter any of the
estimates that are usually computed in the economic geography literature. Second, we address
the important question of whether distortions due to the MAUP are large compared to those
resulting from specification changes.
Disentangling these two effects is essential for policy. For instance, much work has tried to
check empirically whether agglomeration enhances economic performance at the scale of coun-
tries, European regions, US states or even smaller spatial units such as US counties or French em-
ployment areas. The size of the resulting estimates differs between papers, but we do not know
whether this reflects zoning systems or real differences in the extent of knowledge spillovers,
intermediate input linkages, and labor-pooling effects on firm productivity. The resulting eco-
nomic policy prescriptions regarding cluster-formation strategies will be affected accordingly.
In the same vein, a large body of literature has evaluated the degree of spatial concentration,
but does not check whether the conclusion that some industries are more concentrated than oth-
ers results from the chosen zoning system or from more fundamental differences in the size of
agglomeration and dispersion forces across industries at different spatial scales.
This paper is based on three standard empirical questions in economic geography, although
many others could have been considered.1 We start by evaluating the degree of spatial con-
centration under three types of zoning systems: administrative, grid and partly random spatial
units. We then compare the differences between concentration measures (Gini vs. Ellison and
Glaeser) with those between zoning systems. We then turn to regression analysis. Not only is
the measure of any spatial phenomenon likely to be sensitive to the MAUP, but also its correla-
tion with other variables. We estimate the impact of employment density on labor productivity
and compare the size of agglomeration economies across zoning systems and econometric spe-
cifications. Finally, we run gravity regressions. As trade determinants are highly sensitive to
distance, and are hence a priori more exposed to the MAUP, it is particularly relevant to evalu-
ate the impact of MAUP relative to mis-specification in this context.
All of the empirical exercises suggest that changing the size of spatial units only slightly al-
1For comparison purposes, we use the same specifications as those typically found in the literature (see Combes,
Mayer, and Thisse (2008)), even though we do not necessarily think that they are the most apt.
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ters economic geography estimates, and changing their shapematters even less. Both distortions
are secondary compared to specification issues.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides a simple illustration of
the possible size- and shape-dependency of spatial statistical inference, along with a brief review
of the MAUP literature. Section 3 lists the zoning systems for which our estimations are carried
out. As a first sensitivity test, Section 4 is dedicated to the study of French spatial-concentration
patterns. Sections 5 and 6 investigate the extent to which changing econometric specifications
and zoning systems affect the size and significance of wage and trade determinants respectively.
Section 7 concludes and suggests further lines of research.
2 The Modifiable Areal Unit Problem: A Quick Tour
The Modifiable Areal Unit Problem is a longstanding issue for geographers. In their seminal
contribution, Gehlke and Biehl (1934) were the first to emphasize that simple statistics such as
correlation coefficients could vary tremendously across zoning systems. They note that, in the
United States, the correlation between male juvenile delinquency and the median equivalent
monthly housing rent increases monotonically with the size of spatial units. Openshaw and
Taylor (1979) pursued this line of investigation and, drawing on correlations between the per-
centage of Republican voters and the percentage of the population over sixty, standardize what
they called the “Modifiable Areal Unit Problem”.2
2.1 A simple illustration of the MAUP
Spatial statistics may vary along two dimensions: firstly, the level of aggregation, or the size
of spatial units, and secondly, at a given spatial resolution, the drawing of their boundaries,
or their shape. Figure 1 illustrates these two related issues via the employment density - labor
productivity relationship.
Black points display the location of skilled workers, whose individual productivity is de-
noted y, while empty dots stand for unskilled workers, with productivity y < y. In the top
figure, space is divided into four rectangles, each consisting of three skilled and two unskilled
workers. The spatial distribution of workers across units is uniform and average productivity
is the same across units. To illustrate the shape effect, consider the bottom-left figure. Spatial
concentration emerges here, with two clusters of six high-skilled workers and two clusters of
four low-skilled workers. Average productivity is higher in the former due to the spatial sort-
ing of labor skills. Hence, agglomeration economies, defined here as the positive correlation
between productivity and employment density, are zero in the first zoning system but positive
in the second. We now turn to the size effect. In the bottom-right figure, we consider smaller
rectangles with the same proportions as in the top figure. Spatial concentration is also found
2See Fotheringham and Wong (1991) for an extended review of the earliest MAUP contributions.
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Figure 1: The size and shape issues
here, but the relationship between productivity and density is less marked than in the bottom-
left case. Indeed, the difference in productivity between low- and high-productivity regions
remains the same (except for empty boxes), whereas the density gap increases in the bottom-
right case.
The extent and scope of agglomeration economies change with the size and shape of units,
even though the underlying spatial information -the location and productivity of workers- re-
mains the same. Even so, the issue ismore subtle than at first sight. While it is clear that changing
the zoning system will likely alter the perception of a particular phenomenon, the crucial ques-
tion is whether the measurement errors this induces are systematic or random. If the former,
extreme caution is warranted in interpreting the results, because systematic errors imply that,
for a given zoning system, part of the underlying process has been omitted from the estimation.
Consequently, policy prescriptions from a particular zoning system may not be very informat-
ive. In the latter case, as the economic phenomenon is neither size- nor shape-dependent, the
MAUP is not an issue per se, since most estimation procedures are robust to random measure-
ment errors. This paper aims to disentangle the two effects.
2.2 Related literature
A number of authors have provided detailed analyses of the MAUP. Using simple univariate
statistics, such as the mean and the variance, Amrhein and Reynolds (1996) and Amrhein and
Reynolds (1997) show that size and shape distortions depend on the aggregation process, and
more precisely on whether information is either averaged or summed, as well as on the spatial
organization of raw data, as reflected for instance in its spatial autocorrelation coefficient. Ac-
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cording to Arbia (1989), size and shape distortions are minimized (although never eliminated)
under two restrictive conditions: the exact equivalence of sub-areas (in terms of size, shape
and neighboring structure) and the absence of spatial auto-correlation. Clear theoretical un-
derpinnings are more difficult to come by for other statistics such as correlations or regression
estimates. Fotheringham and Wong (1991) consider a multivariate analysis of the determinants
of mean household income for various zoning systems, and come to an alarming conclusion:
“The MAUP [...] is shown to produce highly unreliable results in the multivariate analysis of
data drawn from areal units”. They also find a sizeable range for correlation and regression
coefficients, which are positively (or negatively) significant for certain data configurations, but
insignificant for others, suggesting that inference is not robust to the aggregation process.
Amrhein (1995) was the first to suggest separating aggregation effects from other types of
discrepancies, such as model mis-specification. One of his appealing results is that well-suited
models, such as Amrhein and Flowerdew (1992), do not produce distortive aggregation ef-
fects, whereas others, for instance Fotheringham and Wong (1991), are contaminated by size
and shape.
We extend this literature in a number of ways. First of all, we systematically assess the mag-
nitude of size and shape distortions relative to mis-specification biases. Secondly, we examine
different aggregation processes to test the robustness of economic inference to the MAUP, since
for agglomeration economies, raw information is averaged over spatial units, while for trade
flows it is summed. Finally, we extend the work of Fotheringham and Wong (1991) by com-
paring the estimates from six different administrative and grid zoning systems to those from a
hundred random equivalent zoning systems.
3 Zoning systems and data
The first zoning systemwe consider is that composed of 341 continental “Employment areas”
(EA). These spatial units are underpinned by clear economic foundations, being defined by the
French National Institute of Statistics and Economics (INSEE) so as to minimize daily cross-
boundary commuting, or equivalently to maximize the coincidence between residential and
working areas. This zoning system was designed to reduce the statistical artefact due to bound-
aries, which is why it is widely used in France. As can be seen on the left-hand side of Figure 2,
the average employment area is fairly small, covering 1,570 km2, which is equivalent to splitting
the U.S. continental territory into over 4,700 units.
Shape distortions can be identified from spatial units that are similar in size (or number)
to differently-shaped employment areas. Conversely, size distortions can be highlighted with
partitions of France involving units that are larger than the 341 EAs. Hence, to disentangle the
two faces of the MAUP, we appeal to three other sets of zoning systems.
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Figure 2: Small zoning systems
341 Employment Areas (EA) 341 Small Rectangles (SR)
3.1 Administrative zoning systems
The first set refers to French administrative units. Continental France is partitioned into
21 administrative “Re´gions” (RE), depicted on the left of Figure 3, which are themselves split
into 94 “De´partements” (DE), shown on the left of Figure 4. All such units are aggregates of
municipalities, the finest French spatial division for which data are available.3
It can nonetheless be argued that administrative boundaries do not capture the essence of
economic phenomena that often spill over boundaries, which is one of the reasons why EAs
were created. To circumvent this drawback, some authors, especially geographers, prefer to
work with (often arbitrarily-drawn) grids. The rationale is that, even if they do not necessarily
better match the “true boundaries” of economic phenomena, grid zoning systems provide a
greater degree of homogeneity of spatial units than do administrative zoning systems.4
3The French metropolitan area is covered by 36,247 municipalities. The division of France into de´partements
was adopted simultaneously with the first French constitution in 1790, replacing the old “provinces”, which more
or less represented dioceses. However, these latter exhibited significant variation in tax systems, population and
land areas, and the new division aimed to create more “regular” spatial units under a common central legislation
and administration. Their size was chosen so that individuals from any point in the de´partement could make the
round trip by horse to the capital city in no more than two days, which translated into a radius of 30 to 40 km.
Regarding the shape, a lively debate opposed the defenders of grid zoning against the partisans of keeping alive “the
tight links created long ago by moral standards, customs, production, language and nature”. The former strategy
proposed dividing France into 80 grid units, but the latter division was finally adopted, which resulted in 83 fairly
homogenous (but not geometrically identical) de´partements, the number of which was later increased to 94. In 1956,
de´partements were grouped together into re´gions, in order to lead some policies at a larger spatial scale.
4Another argument refers to intertemporal comparisons when using fixed grid zoning systems. These do not
change over time, while administrative zones may do so. See ESPON (2006) for an overview of this issue.
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3.2 Grid zoning systems
We therefore construct a second set of zoning systems purely based on grid units. We first
enclose France into the smallest possible rectangle. We then divide this rectangle into smal-
ler equally-sized sub-rectangles (based on longitude and latitude). As France is not rectangle
(and closer to an hexagon, actually), several sub-rectangles which map onto water are obviously
left out. We obtain the final grid by aggregating municipalities according to the sub-rectangle
in which they have their centroid. The resulting spatial units are not perfect “rectangles” as
their boundaries follow those of real municipalities. We choose the size of the sub-rectangles to
produce three different zoning systems analogous to administrative zoning systems: 22 (non-
empty) large rectangles (LR), 91 medium rectangles (MR) and 341 small rectangles (SR). It is
worth noting that the largest zoning systems (LR and MR in Figures 3 and 4) include several
rectangles which are partially truncated due to French national boundaries. The finest grid such
as SR (Figure 2) circumvents this pitfall at the expense of geometry, since the units boundaries
become increasingly ragged at the very fine scale. Therefore, overtly enlarging or tightening the
units alters both their symmetry and regularity.
Figure 3: Large zoning systems
21 Re´gions (RE) 22 Large Rectangles (LR)
A comparison of the results obtained under respectively RE, DE and EA or LR, MR and SR
gives a flavor of any size distortions. We capture the impact of shape by comparing the results
obtained across zoning systems involving units of similar size (RE to LR, DE to MR, and EA to SR).
While these comparisons tell us whether MAUP distortions exist, they do not indicate whether
the differences in the results are systematic and significant, however, which is why we propose
a third set of zoning systems.
6
Figure 4: Medium zoning systems
94 De´partements (DE) 91 Medium Rectangles (MR)
3.3 Partly random zoning systems
Our third set of zoning systems involves arbitrarily-drawn spatial units. We define a set of
100 different partitions of France, by randomly aggregating the 4,662 French “Cantons”,5 into
zoning systems that have a number of units strictly equivalent to those of administrative ones
(341 units for EA, 94 for DE and 21 for RE): we call these REA, RDE and RRE respectively. These
are constructed using the following algorithm. We randomly draw one canton, called the seed,
within each administrative unit. We then aggregate each seed to a second canton randomly
drawn from those contiguous to it. We continue with a third canton and so on, until all existing
cantons have been drawn. We run the algorithm 100 times at each scale. Broadly speaking, this
procedure produces, for each scale, a partition of France with jiggling borders.
3.4 Characteristics of zoning systems
Our empirical analysis builds on sectoral time-series data at the municipal level. The aggreg-
ation into the aforementioned larger zoning systems yields a three-dimension panel of employ-
ment, number of plants and wages for 18 years (within the 1976-1996) period and 99 industries
(at the two-digit level for both manufacturing and services). For 1996, we match this panel to a
trade data set for manufactured goods. More details are provided in Appendix.
As can be seen in Table 1, zoning systems differ sharply in their economic features. The spa-
tial variation in land area is smaller for small grid units than for employment areas, a property
5We use this intermediate grouping of French municipalities to reduce the computational time without losing too
much spatial variability in the randomization process.
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Table 1: Summary statistics
Zoning system (EA) (SR) (DE) (MR) (RE) (LR)
Number of units 341 341 94 91 21 22
Land area (km2) Av. 1569.8 1580.4 5733.3 5922.3 25663.4 24496.7
Cv. 0.63 0.35 0.34 0.50 0.43 0.53
Employment (workers) Av. 2012 2019 7300 7541 32678 31193
Cv. 4.6 1.5 12.3 1.7 1.8 1.3
Employment density (workers/km2) Av. 4.6 1.5 12.3 1.7 1.8 1.3
Cv. 8.7 3.1 6.3 1.7 1.8 0.8
Wage Av. 1.3 1.2 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3
Cv. 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
Inter-area distance (km) Av. 396 421 392 454 402 486
Cv. 0.48 0.48 0.47 0.47 0.43 0.42
Trade flow (tons×1000) Av. 30.96 35.55 84.03 112.09 778.84 918.56
Cv. 3.1 3.8 3.0 3.1 1.5 1.9
Notes: (i) (EA): employment areas, (SR): small rectangles, (DE): de´partements, (MR): medium rect-
angles, (RE): re´gions, (LR): large rectangles. (ii) 1976-1996 average, except for trade flows (1996
value). (iii) Av. is the mean. Cv is the Coefficient of variation (standard deviation divided by
mean). (iii) No units for wage because detrended and centered around individual mean.
that does not hold for larger administrative units. This reflects two opposite effects. On the one
hand, grid units are more regular, which reduces the variance. On the other hand, the share of
truncated grid units increases with size, which increases the variance. The latter effect domin-
ates for medium and large units. A clear drawback of the grid strategy is that, when units are
not small enough, the gains of reducing the variance of land area cannot be attained due to the
irregularity of national borders. Conversely, this also shows that the French authorities were
fairly successful in designing quite homogenous administrative units.
Regarding the other variables, an important distinction concerns the way in which inform-
ation is aggregated. The values of summed information (employment and trade flows) increase
with the size of the units, which is straightforward. By way of contrast, the overall picture
should vary less for averaged information, insofar as boundaries do not create too many non-
random errors. For instance, employment density differs only little across grid zoning systems,
regardless of the size of their units, while it varies more for administrative units, which reflects
that the design of administrative zoning systems was not based on this variable. The suspicion
that the MAUP could therefore bias density estimations motivates the exercise carried out in
Section 5. Average wages are little affected by zoning system.
Finally, variations across zoning systems are smaller for distance and trade than for employ-
ment density. Note however that distance increases with size and the shift from administrative
to grid units. Therefore, boundaries do seem to affect the measurement of distance, which seems
upward-biased for large-size and grid units. This other source of potential non-random errors
is explored in detail in Sections 5 and 6.
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4 Spatial concentration
Before turning to regression analysis, we carry out the most basic exercise in economic geo-
graphy, which consists in measuring the extent of spatial concentration, an issue widely-covered
in the literature. Apart from a small number of continuous approaches, such as Duranton and
Overman (2005), work in this area is based on discrete zoning systems. While some work has fo-
cussed on the comparison of spatial concentration across industries, such as Ellison and Glaeser
(1997), only little has assessed the legitimacy of comparing results across zoning systems that
differ in the size and shape of spatial units. In this section, we compare the variability in con-
centration due to the zoning system with that from different concentration indices.
4.1 Gini indices
We compute the spatial Gini index associated with every administrative and grid zoning
system by industry. We then rank industries by spatial concentration and compute Spearman
rank correlations across zoning systems. The results are shown in Table 2.
Table 2: Spearman rank correlations of Gini indices (1976-1996 average)
(EA) (SR) (DE) (MR) (RE) (LR)
(EA) 1 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.95 0.95
(SR) 1 0.98 0.99 0.96 0.96
(DE) 1 0.99 0.97 0.97
(MR) 1 0.98 0.98
(RE) 1 0.98
(LR) 1
Note: (EA): employment areas, (SR): small
rectangles, (DE): de´partements, (MR): me-
dium rectangles, (RE): re´gions, (LR): large
rectangles.
Rank correlations across zoning systems that are similar in size (EA and SR, DE and MR, and
RE and LR) are very high, with values of at least 0.98 (see the sub-diagonal elements in Table
2). The ranking of industries is therefore virtually unaffected by changes in the shape of units.
Size has a slightly greater effect on concentration. For instance, the rank correlation between
employment areas and re´gions is 0.95, which remains high. Making shape more homogeneous
across scales leads to similar results, with the correlation between small and large rectangle
zoning systems being 0.96.
With respect to partly random zoning systems, we restrict ourselves to the year 1996 for
computational reasons. Figure 5 plots the average (over 100 runs) of the Gini obtained in each
industry, for respectively the REA, RDE and RRE zoning systems. Industries are ranked by as-
cending Gini at the REA level (the upper dark points).
Two comments are in order. First, regardless of the industry, the Gini index falls with aggreg-
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Figure 5: The size-dependency of the Gini index
Note: (REA): Random employment areas, (RDE):
Random de´partements, (RE): Random re´gions.
ation level, the difference being less pronounced at both lower and higher values. The intuition
is that smaller units units have more areas with no registered employment, which raises the Gini
index mechanically. Second, Figure 5 shows that ranks are not consistent across zoning systems.
For instance, industry hierarchy is not the same for REA as for RDE and RRE. However, rank
correlations remain high, at respectively 0.95 for REA-RRE (on average, over the 10, 000 possible
combinations of zoning systems), 0.99 for REA-RDE and 0.97 for RDE-RRE. This further suggests
that size matters little. Moreover, the weak shape-dependency observed for administrative and
grid zoning systems is confirmed by the average industry rank correlations across random zon-
ing systems at each scale, which are respectively 1, 1, and 0.98 for REA, RDE and RRE.
4.2 Ellison and Glaeser indices
It is well known that the spatial Gini index is contaminated by industry structure. Given total
industry employment, industries with fewer plants will have higher Ginis, even with random
plant location. Ellison and Glaeser (1997) develop a measure of concentration that is purged of
this plant size effect. Table 3 depicts the Spearman rank correlations for this index.
The rank correlations are generally lower than those for the Gini indices. Hence, any distor-
tions due to theMAUP are more pronounced when spatial concentration is measured via the EG
index. In particular, size distortions are clearly aggravated, even though the rank correlations
remain fairly high (0.80 for instance between employment areas and re´gion).
Further support comes from partly random zoning systems. With respect to shape, the av-
erage rank correlation is 0.99 for both REA and RDE, and 0.88 only for RRE. Regarding size, the
related correlation is 0.88 for the REA-RDE pair, 0.77 for REA-RRE and 0.81 for DE-RE. Hence,
the EG index, although more sophisticated, is somewhat more sensitive to the MAUP. Such size
effects clearly stand out in Figure 6, which depicts average (over 100 runs) EG indices for re-
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Table 3: Spearman correlations for EG indices (1976-1996 average)
(EA) (SR) (DE) (MR) (RE) (LR)
(EA) 1 0.78 0.92 0.81 0.80 0.77
(SR) 1 0.72 0.86 0.84 0.82
(DE) 1 0.81 0.81 0.77
(MR) 1 0.93 0.89
(RE) 1 0.93
(LR) 1
Note: (EA): employment areas, (SR): small
rectangles, (DE): de´partements, (MR): me-
dium rectangles, (RE): re´gions, (LR): large
rectangles.
spectively the REA, RDE and RRE zoning systems. Contrary to the Gini index, the EG index
increases with the size of units. Further, aggregation discrepancies are not uniform, being more
pronounced in the right-hand tail of the distribution.
Figure 6: The size-dependency of the EG index
Note: (REA): Random employment areas, (RDE):
Random de´partements, (RE): Random re´gions.
4.3 Comparison between the Gini and the EG
The success of the EG index over the Gini coefficient lies in its alleviation of concentration
due to the location of big plants. The crucial question we address here is whether the zoning
system affects the ranking of industries more than does the choice of the index itself. To answer,
we turn to a between-index rank correlation analysis.
Tables 4 and 5 show that the between-index Spearman rank correlations are definitely smal-
ler than their within counterparts. Even within each zoning system (the diagonal elements of
Table 4), the rank correlation is 0.77 at best (for the RE zoning system), with the lowest correlation
being 0.52 (EA or SR).
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Table 4: Spearman rank correlations between Gini and EG indices (1976-1996 average)
EG (EA) EG (SR) EG (DE) EG (MR) EG (RE) EG (LR)
Gini (EA) 0.56 0.49 0.59 0.58 0.63 0.59
Gini (SR) 0.56 0.52 0.59 0.60 0.65 0.61
Gini (DE) 0.60 0.52 0.64 0.61 0.67 0.63
Gini (MR) 0.59 0.54 0.62 0.64 0.69 0.64
Gini (RE) 0.64 0.61 0.67 0.70 0.77 0.71
Gini (LR) 0.64 0.61 0.68 0.70 0.75 0.73
Note: (EA): employment areas, (SR): small rectangles, (DE): de´partements,
(MR): medium rectangles, (RE): re´gions, (LR): large rectangles.
Table 5: Rank correlations between Gini and EG indices (Average over 100 runs)
EG (REA) EG (RDE) EG (RRE)
Gini (REA) 0.56 0.55 0.60
Gini (RDE) 0.61 0.61 0.64
Gini (RRE) 0.65 0.66 0.75
Note: (REA): Random employment areas,
(RDE): Random de´partements, (RRE): Random
re´gions.
There is considerable evidence that index choice, which we can consider as a specification
issue, produces greater distortions than the choice of zoning system, in terms of both size or
shape. It should thus be of greater concern than the MAUP.
To further gauge the extent of the bias induced by mis-specification compared to the MAUP,
a detailed look at particular industries is useful. The left-hand side of Figures 7 and 8, shows the
concentration patterns in the “Textile” and “Hotels and Restaurants” industries: 6 it is clear that
the Gini index exhibits more concentration at low-scale resolutions. Turning to EG estimates
(Figures 7 and 8), the reverse pattern holds: concentration now increases with scale. Moreover,
the time patterns of concentration are fairly consistent for a given index, regardless of the scale,
while greater differences are found between indices. For instance, in Figure 7, the movement in
the Gini index suggests an upwards trend in the textile industry from 1995 onwards, whereas
no such trend is seen in the EG index at medium or large size. By way of contrast, the differ-
ences due to shape (that is, between the dashed and plain curves in Figures 7 and 8) are less
pronounced than the differences between indices, and smaller than those between scales. We
cannot therefore reject that size affects the level and, to a lesser extent, the time pattern of spa-
tial concentration. However, the conclusions depend critically on the choice of the index (Gini
or EG). Consequently, thinking about which index is the most relevant is more important than
the MAUP: the finding of rising or falling concentration likely substantially affects the ensuing
policy prescriptions.
6The (similar) results for other industries are available upon request .
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Figure 7: Textile Manufacture Industry
Gini index EG index
Notes: (i) EA: employment areas, SR: small rectangles, DE: de´partements, MR: medium rectangles, RE:
re´gions, LR: large rectangles.
Figure 8: Hotels and Restaurants
Gini index EG index
Notes: (i) EA: employment areas, SR: small rectangles, DE: de´partements, MR: medium rectangles, RE:
re´gions, LR: large rectangles.
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5 Agglomeration economies
While the MAUP only slightly distorts spatial concentration patterns, it might have a greater
effect on the explanation of the spatial distribution of economic variables. We therefore now
consider the incidence of the MAUP in the context of multivariate regression analysis. In this
section, we focus on the estimation of agglomeration economies. Evaluating the magnitude
of the benefits reaped from spatial proximity is important for policy, and much work, such as
Ciccone and Hall (1996), has been devoted to the estimation of the productivity gains resulting
from dense clusters of activities. The benefits from proximity to large markets and the local
composition of labour skills are generally simultaneously estimated.7
We regress local wages, a frequently-used measure of local labor productivity, on local em-
ployment density. Let wat denote the wage in area a at date t, computed as average earnings of
all workers located in a at date t (henceforth the gross wage), and Denat employment density
(per square Km). The benchmark specification we run is the following:
logwat = α logDenat + γXat + εat, (1)
where Xat is a vector of control variables. We compare the estimated elasticity of wages to
employment density across zoning systems. As above, we then check whether the choice of
zoning systems matters less for the size of agglomeration economies than the biases from choice
of controls in the wage equation, which is a specification issue.
5.1 A simple correlation
It is useful to briefly look at simple gross wage / density correlations to have an idea of
agglomeration economies. Given the panel structure of the data, we estimate equation (1) with
no controls other than time dummies. Table 6 shows the resulting elasticities.
Table 6: Gross wages and density: simple correlations
Dependent Variable: Log of gross wage
(pooled across years)
Zoning system (EA) (SR) (DE) (MR) (RE) (LR)
Density 0.071a 0.07a 0.073a 0.05a 0.09a 0.099a
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.006)
Time dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Obs. 6138 6118 1692 1638 378 396
R2 0.47 0.24 0.73 0.38 0.76 0.55
Notes: (i) (EA) = employment areas; (SR) = small rectangles; (DE) =
de´partements; (MR) = medium rectangles; (RE) = re´gions; (LR) = large
rectangles. (ii) All variables in logarithms. (iii) Standard-errors in
brackets. (iv) a, b, c : Significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels re-
spectively.
7See Combes, Mayer, and Thisse (2008).
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The elasticity of wages with respect to density is not significantly affected by shape. In both
EA and SR, the value is about 0.07, which lies within the range of [0.04, 0.11] reported in Combes,
Mayer, and Thisse (2008), drawn from the analysis of US and European data. Even though
some differences result from the move to a larger scale, the shape effect remains small. Size
differences do not really matter when moving from small to medium units, although larger
differences occur as we move to the largest units. However, this is not necessarily due to the
size distortion induced by the MAUP. At small spatial scales density economies mainly work
through technological spillovers and labor pooling; at larger scales, they are mainly generated
by sharingmarkets for final and intermediate goods. Hence, there is no reason why the elasticity
of productivity with respect to density should be the same. However, we do not know how
much of the difference reflects real economic phenomena and how much the MAUP.
It is worth noting that the explanatory power of employment density is significantly lower
(almost halved) for the grid than for the administrative units. Therefore, boundaries which do
not reflect administrative/economic realities do actually generate measurement errors, possibly
in both the left-hand and right-hand side variables. However, the good news is that these errors
seem to be largely randomly distributed: even though density loses explanatory power, the
overall picture with respect to elasticity is one of stability.
As a second step, we compare the two MAUP effects to those resulting from the inclusion in
the wage equation of controls for skills (Section 5.2), and market potential (Section 5.3).
5.2 Controlling for skills and experience
Our empirical analysis uses rich individual wage information from a large panel of workers
followed across time and jobs. We are hence able to apply a sophisticated procedure to control
for local skills, and to check whether the greater productivity observed in dense areas is partly
due to the spatial sorting of workers as suggested by Combes, Duranton, and Gobillon (2008).
In a first stage, we calculate local wages net of individual skills and experience, as follows:
wit = θi + νj(i,t) +Xitβ + it,
where wit is the wage of worker i at date t. This is a function of θi, an individual fixed-effect cap-
turing the impact of both time-invariant observed and unobserved skills, νj(i,t), an effect specific
to the firm j where i is employed at date t, and Xit a set of controls for worker’s i experience
at date t (age, age-squared, and number of previous jobs interacted with gender). Based on the
estimates provided in Abowd, Creecy, and Kramarz (2003), and following Combes, Duranton,
and Gobillon (2008), we define a wage net of any individual observed and unobserved skills
and experience effects,
(
wit − θˆi −Xitβˆ
)
. We then compute the average of this net wage over
all individuals living in the same area a, at date t (henceforth net wage). This yields a measure
of local labor productivity purged of individual skills and experience. We proceed by regressing
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net wages on employment density. The results are shown in Table 7.
Table 7: Net wages and density: simple correlations
Dependent Variable: Log of net wages
(pooled across years)
Zoning system (EA) (SR) (DE) (MR) (RE) (LR)
Density 0.033a 0.028a 0.029a 0.023a 0.048a 0.052a
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004)
Time dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Obs. 6138 6118 1692 1638 378 396
R2 0.22 0.10 0.34 0.24 0.62 0.57
Notes: (i) (EA) = employment areas; (SR) = small rectangles; (DE) =
de´partements; (MR) = medium rectangles; (RE) = re´gions; (LR) = large
rectangles. (ii) All variables in logarithms. (iii) Standard-errors in brack-
ets. (iv) a, b, c : Significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.
The elasticity of net wages with respect to employment density is half of that for gross wages,
which is a difference of an order of magnitude greater than that due to the MAUP. We therefore
reach the same conclusion as previously: differences due to the size and shape of spatial units are
small compared to the upward bias induced by the omission of workers’ skills and experience
in the wage equation. Moreover, shape distortions are even attenuated in many cases (between
DE and MR, and RE and LR, for instance), once these controls are included.
5.3 Market potential as a new control
Not only local density and skill composition affect labor performance, but so does the prox-
imity to large economic centers outside the area. A major drawback of the above wage specific-
ations is that there are no controls for the relative position of the area within the whole economy.
For instance, wage equations derived from fully-specified economic geography models, such as
Redding and Venables (2004) and Hanson (2005), account for spatial proximity via structural
demand and supply access variables. It is beyond the scope of this paper to replicate such a
sophisticated and difficult to implement approach. Here we only include, as well as density,
a Harris (1954) market potential variable based on the employment accessible from any given
area, divided by the distance necessary to reach them:8
Market Potential =
∑
a′ 6=a
Ya′
Dista,a′
, (2)
where Ya′ is employment in area a andDista,a′ , the distance between areas a and a′. The results
for gross and net wages are listed in Tables 8 and 9 respectively.
Once market potential is accounted for, the impact of density on gross wage is attenuated.
Regardless of the zoning system and the wage (gross vs net), the density coefficients are around
8The literature shows that this atheoretic market potential often has the same explanatory power as structural
market potential.
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Table 8: The spatial determinants of gross wages
Dependent Variable: Log of gross wage
(pooled across years)
Zoning system (EA) (SR) (DE) (MR) (RE) (LR)
Density 0.055a 0.065a 0.059a 0.05a 0.09a 0.098a
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.006)
Market Potential 0.1a 0.099a 0.062a 0.079a 0.024b -0.009
(0.004) (0.008) (0.005) (0.008) (0.011) (0.02)
Time dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Obs. 6138 6118 1692 1638 378 396
R2 0.52 0.26 0.75 0.41 0.77 0.55
Notes: (i) (EA) = employment areas; (SR) = small rectangles; (DE) =
de´partements; (MR) = medium rectangles; (RE) = re´gions; (LR) = large rect-
angles. (ii) All variables in logarithms. (iii) Standard-errors in brackets. (iv)
a, b, c : Significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.
Table 9: The spatial determinants of net wages
Dependent Variable: Log of net wage
(pooled across years)
Zoning system (EA) (SR) (DE) (MR) (RE) (LR)
Density 0.027a 0.026a 0.021a 0.023a 0.048a 0.052a
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004)
Market Potential 0.037a 0.043a 0.036a 0.044a 0.023b -0.0002
(0.004) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.01) (0.012)
Time dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Obs. 6138 6118 1692 1638 378 396
R2 0.23 0.10 0.35 0.26 0.62 0.57
Notes: (i) (EA) = employment areas; (SR) = small rectangles; (DE) =
de´partements; (MR) = medium rectangles; (RE) = re´gions; (LR) = large rect-
angles. (ii) All variables in logarithms. (iii) Standard-errors in brackets. (iv)
a, b, c : Significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.
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30% lower. The impact of market potential is slightly stronger in the medium rectangles than
for their administrative counterparts, de´partements. This is consistent with the intuition that
cross-boundary discrepancies should be more salient for grid units that were not designed to
minimize them in the first place. Market potential is no longer significant at the regional level,
which is consistent with French re´gions being large enough to depend mainly on themselves (or
possibly on foreign markets, which are not considered here) rather than on each other. Even so,
this variable depends on distance which makes it definitely more sensitive to the MAUP than,
for instance, density, as we noted in section 3.4.
Table 9 exhibits striking similarities. Shape has virtually no effect, and size alters only slightly
the results. In addition to the aforementioned larger impact of density and the smaller impact
of market potential for large zoning systems, most differences are insignificant and are much
lower than those from a change in specification. For instance, density increases productivity
by only 2.7% at the small-unit level, once skills and market potential are controlled for, while
the baseline estimates were over 7%. This difference supports the findings in the literature (see
Combes, Mayer, and Thisse (2008)) and confirms our conclusion that MAUP is of secondary
concern compared to modeling issues.9
Figure 9 maps out the density and market potential coefficients obtained from the three
partly random zoning systems. For a given size, the dispersion of estimates is much lower than
that induced by a shift of specification, which confirms the absence of shape effects. The only
significant difference due to size regards density in the largest units. Even so, this almost van-
ishes in the best specification (net wages), as do the differences in the impact of market potential.
These conclusions clearly echo the findings of Amrhein and Flowerdew (1992) and suggest that
a good specification is actually an efficient way to circumvent the MAUP, even when variables
do depend on distance.
Our previous conclusion regarding the sensitivity of concentration measures is confirmed
by the analysis of productivity: specification is more important than the MAUP and, within
the MAUP, size matters more than shape, and more so when the model is mis-specified and
variables are distance-dependent.
6 Gravity equations
To test whether distance plays a systematic role in aggravating the distortions due to MAUP,
we turn to the estimation of gravity equations.
9One important concern is not tackled here. In the analysis of how agglomeration enhances performance, we
inevitably face the major difficulty that causality could run both ways: then worker’s location is actually determined
by wages. However, we leave this issue to one side here, as it has already been extensively discussed in the literature,
and is orthogonal to the MAUP.
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Figure 9: The size- and shape- dependency of wage determinants
Note: (REA): Random employment areas, (RDE): Random de´partements, (RE): Random re´gions.
6.1 Basic gravity
The gravity model has been widely used to investigate the determinants of trade. A basic
specification explains the trade flow Faa′ , originating from area a and shipped to area a′, by
various proxies for the proximity between a and a′. These include the distance between a and
a′, Distaa′ , and a dummy variable stating whether the areas are contiguous, Contigaa′ . Finally,
the famous “border effect” is captured by a dummy variable for within-area flows,Withina=a′ .
As a first step, we estimate the following two-way fixed-effect specification:
ln (Faa′) = θa + θa′ − ρ ln (Distaa′) + φContigaa′ + ψWithina=a′ + aa′ , (3)
where θa and θ′a are destination and origin fixed effects respectively, and aa′ is an error term.
This fixed-effect approach has the attractive property of being structurally compatible with
many trade models (based on comparative advantage as well as imperfect competition).10
Table 10 reports the related estimates under both the administrative and grid zoning systems.
The distance elasticity is around 20% larger for grid than for administrative zoning systems, at
a given scale. Contiguity is less affected by shape. Again, size effects are slightly more salient,
especially when moving from the EA-SR to either the DE-MR or RE-LR zoning systems. The
magnitude of the distance effect (in absolute value) increases with size (for the administrative
and grid zoning systems), as does that of contiguity. The border effect is always lower for grid
zoning systems, which is further evidence of the economic consistency of administrative units.
Measurement errors stemming from the use of grid zoning systems are less random for trade
and proximity variables than for wage and density. This makes sense as trade and proximity
are inherently sensitive to distance, which is not the case for the other two variables. Moreover,
shape and size systematically bias the measurement of distance, as observed in Section 3.4.
10See Feenstra (2003).
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Table 10: Basic gravity
Dependent Variable: log of positive flows
(Year 1996)
Zoning system (EA) (SR) (DE) (MR) (RE) (LR)
Distance -1.002a -1.175a -1.604a -1.899a -1.678a -1.996a
(0.022) (0.024) (0.061) (0.048) (0.116) (0.09)
Border 1.810a 1.289a 1.619a 0.804a 1.676a 1.162a
(0.062) (0.06) (0.113) (0.113) (0.155) (0.252)
Contiguity 1.010a 1.128a 1.045a 1.069a 0.768a 0.829a
(0.041) (0.044) (0.063) (0.071) (0.073) (0.086)
Obs. 24849 22189 6600 5069 441 443
R2 0.518 0.545 0.708 0.756 0.941 0.939
Notes: (i) (EA) = employment areas; (SR) = small rectangles; (DE) = de´partements;
(MR) = medium rectangles; (RE) = re´gions; (LR) = large rectangles. (ii) All variables
in logarithms. (iii) Standard-errors in brackets. (iv) a, b, c : Significant at the 1%, 5%
and 10% levels respectively.
Figure 10 illustrates the way in which both size and shape affect the values and standard
errors of estimates from partly random zoning systems. Dark dots in the top-left figure stand
for distance (and contiguity and border in the top-right and bottom figures respectively). The
95% confidence interval is shown by the surrounding lighter dots. Note that random zoning
systems are ranked by increasing estimated values. For all three proximity measures, we find
that the dispersion of estimates increases with scale, suggesting more shape-dependency in lar-
ger zoning systems. Nonetheless, this dispersion is of lower magnitude than the differences due
to moving from one scale to another (from REA to RDE or RRE, regarding distance and border
effects). The shape-dependency of larger zoning systems (especially RRE) is due to two joint
phenomena. First, coefficient estimation is more likely to suffer from finite-sample bias for lar-
ger (and hence less numerous) units. Second, the random process of aggregation is likely to
produce more distinct zoning systems when data are aggregated into larger units.
6.2 Augmented Gravity
Barriers to trade do not only concern proximity. Other trade frictions result from costs un-
related to distance (such as trade policy, exchange-rate volatility, delivery times, and inventory
or regulation costs), and from more subtle frictions due to the need to acquire information on
remote trading partners or to enforce contracts, as emphasized by Rauch (2001). To tackle these,
the literature extends the basic gravity model by making trade costs depend not only on spa-
tial proximity but also on cultural and informational proximity. For instance Wagner, Head, and
Ries (2002) report that migration between two countries enhances their bilateral trade by around
50%. To evaluate the trade-creating impact of social and business networks within countries,
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Figure 10: The size- and shape-dependency of the impact of spatial proximity on trade
Note: (i) The coefficients (b) have to be greater (in
absolute value) than 1.96 times the standard error
(se) to enter into the 95% confidence interval. (ii)
(REA): Random employment areas, (RDE): Random
de´partements, (RE): Random re´gions.
Figure 11: The size- and shape-dependency of the trade-creating impact of migrants
Note: (i) The coefficients (b) have to be greater (in absolute value) than 1.96 times the standard error
(se) to enter into the 95% confidence interval. (ii) (REA): Random employment areas, (RDE): Random
de´partements, (RE): Random re´gions.
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Combes, Lafourcade, and Mayer (2005) estimate:
ln (Faa′) = θa + θa′ − ρ ln (Distaa′) + φContigaa′ + ψWithina=a′
+α ln (1 +Migaa′) + β ln (1 +Miga′a) + γ ln (1 + Plantaa′) + aa′ , (4)
whereMigaa′ is the number of people born in area a′ and working in area a, called (relative to
area a) immigrants, Miga′a are analogously emigrants, and Plantaa′ is the number of financial
connections between plants belonging to the same business group (see Appendix).
Table 11: Augmented Gravity
Dependent Variable: log of positive flows
(1996)
Zoning system (EA) (SR) (DE) (MR) (RE) (LR)
Distance -0.628a -0.714a -1.194a -1.285a -1.261a -1.420a
(0.023) (0.028) (0.063) (0.064) (0.118) (0.129)
Border 1.016a 0.691a 0.587a 0.044 0.192 -0.237
(0.065) (0.07) (0.129) (0.127) (0.226) (0.378)
Contiguity 0.321a 0.421a 0.37a 0.335a 0.22a 0.412a
(0.05) (0.051) (0.068) (0.075) (0.081) (0.119)
Immigrants 0.221a 0.217a 0.24a 0.245a 0.309a 0.211b
(0.014) (0.014) (0.028) (0.034) (0.074) (0.092)
Emigrants 0.232a 0.244a 0.213a 0.274a 0.285a 0.245c
(0.014) (0.015) (0.038) (0.035) (0.108) (0.139)
Plant network 0.063a 0.033b 0.258a 0.035 0.204 0.392c
(0.018) (0.013) (0.08) (0.049) (0.177) (0.204)
Obs. 24561 21606 6600 5059 441 443
R2 0.541 0.574 0.722 0.772 0.954 0.948
Notes: (i) (EA) = employment areas; (SR) = small rectangles; (DE) = de´partements;
(MR) = medium rectangles; (RE) = re´gions; (LR) = large rectangles. (ii) All variables
in logarithms. (iii) Standard-errors in brackets. (iv) a, b, c : Significant at the 1%, 5%
and 10% levels respectively.
It can readily be seen from Table 11 that, controlling for networks reduces the distance elasti-
city by about one-third, whereas the contiguity effect is three to four times smaller. The border
effect is reduced even further, and disappears completely at the RE-LR scales. These effects are
far larger than those due to the two determinants of MAUP, size and shape.
It is worth noting that the trade-creating effect of migrants, which does not directly depend
on distance, is robust to the shift of zoning system, in terms of both size and shape. By way of
contrast, even though the trade-creating impact of business networks increases slightly with the
scale of administrative units, this is no longer statistically significant for grid zoning systems.
Figure 11 displays the estimated immigrant and emigrant coefficients in the same way as in
Figure 10. Both groups of estimates monotonically increase with the level of aggregation.
We therefore continue to find that size matters more than shape. Moreover, the magnitude
of this distortion is definitely larger than in our previous exercises. The obvious explanation is
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that trade equations involve many distance-dependent explanatory variables. Since the MAUP
is fundamentally linked to proximity mis-measurement, it is fairly intuitive that it jeopardizes
the estimation of trade equations more than that of wage equations, and that it is more sali-
ent for market potential within wage equations, in particular when skill variables are omitted.
Specification issues are anyway a more important concern.
7 Conclusions
The overall picture is fairly clear. The use of different specifications to assess spatial con-
centration, agglomeration economies, and trade determinants produces substantial variation in
the estimated coefficients. In most cases, theory provides a clear explanation of such variations,
which are much larger than those sparked by the MAUP. Although size might still be import-
ant, especially in the context of distance-dependent explanatory variables, it is of second-order
compared to specification, while shape is of only third-order concern. On the other hand, when
zoning systems are specifically designed to address local questions, as is the case for French
employment areas, we definitely argue that they should be used. Those who are left with other
administrative units should not worry too much, however. We therefore urge researchers to pay
the most attention to choosing the relevant specification for the question they want to tackle.
We do not of course claim that the various specifications used in this paper are actually the
best. They are simply those frequently found in the economic geography literature. Many other
empirical questions can be considered. We focus on three simple exercises because they are
quite different in spirit, and cover a wide range of estimations. This makes us fairly confident
that our conclusions are robust to other exercises, even though this remains to be shown. Finally,
note that the French economical and institutional design may be, by chance, particularly well-
designed to minimize MAUP problems. We therefore encourage researchers to replicate the
exercises carried out here in other contexts (countries and periods).
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Appendix: Data
Economic variables for all zoning systems are obtained by aggregating information over the
36,247 French municipalities (“communes”).
First, over the 1976-1996 period, the composition in terms of establishments (employment
size, and number of establishments) and workers (year and place of birth, age, gender, occupa-
tion, and wage, among others) is available at the 4-digit industrial level. The data come from
the INSEE survey “De´claration Annuelle de Donne´es Sociales” (DADS), which collects matched
employer-employee information in France. Our analysis builds on a panel extract covering
people born in October of all even-numbered years, excluding civil servants, which is a rep-
resentative 1/24th of the French population. No survey was carried out in 1981, 1983 or 1990,
producing a final sample of over 12.3 million plant-individual year observations, which are then
re-aggregated by spatial unit, year (18 points), and industry (99 two-digit sectors covering both
manufacturing and services).11 As the key parameter of the sampling process is the date of birth,
there is no obvious reason to believe that the sample is geographically biased.
For 1996, the above data are matched with information on the trade volumes shipped by
road, both within and between municipalities, which we aggregate into different larger zoning
systems. The data comes from the French Ministry of Transport, which annually surveys a
stratified random sample of trucks.
Regarding social and business networks, we compute migrant stocks based on the number
of natives from one area who moved to work in another area.12 Business networks are captured
via the number of financial connections between plants belonging to the same business group.
For each business group, we count the number of plants located in each area. We then compute
for each pair of areas the sum over all business groups of the product of the two counts. The data
source here is the INSEE survey “LIaisons FInancie`res” (LIFI), which defines a business group as
the set of all firms controlled either directly or indirectly (over 50%) by the same parent firm,
which is itself not controlled by any other firm.13
Bilateral distances between spatial units are computed as the average of the great-circle dis-
tances between their municipalities, weighted by total employment.
11As in Abowd, Kramarz, and Roux (2006), part-timers are retained and outliers (over five standard errors above
and below the mean) are dropped. The selection of industries and the removal of sampling errors at the smallest
scale follows Combes, Duranton, and Gobillon (2008).
12This figure is also calculated using the DADS survey.
13See Combes, Lafourcade, and Mayer (2005) for more details on the network variables.
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